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The Capital Jury Project: The Role of Responsibility
and How Psychology Can Inform the Law
STEVEN J. SHERMAN*
As an experimental social psychologist, my discussion will address how
psychology research and theory can help us focus on, understand, and perhaps
offer suggestions and solutions for the issues and concerns about capital jury
decision-making that the Capital Jury Project ("CJP") has raised. Psychology
can play a role in two different ways. First, the law itself, in terms of legal
doctrine and practice, and the specific instructions to jurors in capital cases,
makes certain assumptions about how people think, act, make decisions, and
make judgments. Research and theory in several areas of psychology can help
assess the extent to which these assumptions are correct. Second, the CJP has
identified several specific problems concerning the way in which jurors in
capital trials think and act. These problems involve an inability to understand
instructions (especially at the sentencing phase),' a less than perfect recall of
the instructions and procedures,2 and certain biases both in thinking at the
individual level and in making decisions at the group level.' Psychological
research is especially attuned to identifying these types of misunderstandings,
memory failures, and biases in judgment. More importantly, this research may
suggest ways to mitigate or eliminate these problems. Thus, there are many
aspects of the capital trial process to which the field of psychology could
speak. This discussion, however, will focus on only one of these issues-
responsibility in capital sentencing hearings.
I. RESPONSIBILITY
After considering the foregoing articles concerning the CJP, it is clear that
a key factor in life versus death decisions in capital cases is the degree of
responsibility taken by the various participants. Although the responsibility
assumed by the judge, the lawyers, and the defendant clearly plays a role, it
is the degree of personal responsibility assumed by the jurors that is most
central to sentencing decisions.
Two major assumptions regarding responsibility-that perceived responsi-
bility affects decision-making, and that the greater the perceived responsi-
bility, the less likely a juror will choose death-will serve as the basis for this
discussion. Psychology theory and research clearly supports the validity of
both of these assumptions.
* Psychology Department, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.
1. See Joseph L. Hoffinann, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception ofSentencing Responsibility
in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1151-52 (1995); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion
in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1165-75 (1995).
2. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 1, at 1169.
3. See id. at 1171.
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A. Responsibility Is an Important Mediator
of Juror Capital Decisions
Much work in social psychology indicates that the decisions of people who
feel personally responsible for an outcome differ from those decisions where
the individual assumes no such responsibility. This is particularly true when
the decision involves the welfare of another person. Studies of bystander
intervention, involving victims of crime,4 accidents, or other situations of
need, show that feelings of responsibility are a key component of the degree
of help offered by an observer.5 Assuming personal responsibility for the
outcome of decisions also leads decision-makers to take more time in
rendering judgments, and to avoid the biases involved in making quick
judgments. 6 When decision-makers feel less responsible, they generally
employ less complex judgment strategies and may use simple heuristic
principles of judgment.7
Thus, the degree of personal responsibility significantly affects the decision-
making process and can therefore affect the outcome of a decision, particu-
larly when the decision involves consequences to the welfare of another
person or group of persons. Given that a life or death decision during the
sentencing phase of a capital trial is as important a consequence to another
person as there can be, it follows that the degree of responsibility experienced
by a juror would impact on capital decisions.
B. The Less the Jurors' Perceived Personal Responsibility,
the More Likely Is a Death Decision
The literature cited above indicates that perceived responsibility affects
decision-making. A second assumption is that this effect moves predominantly
in one direction when it comes to capital decisions-namely, the greater the
feeling of responsibility, the less likely it becomes that a juror will choose a
death decision. Findings in the psychology literature indicate that diminished
responsibility generally leads to a greater willingness to expose oneself to
negative consequences. 8 These results can be interpreted in the following
way: In order to experience a troubled cognitive state (such as cognitive
dissonance), two conditions are necessary-a feeling of personal responsibility
for a decision, and the occurrence of aversive consequences resulting from the
4. See, e.g., Leonard Bickman, Bystander Intervention in a Crime: The Effect of a Mass Media
Campaign, J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL., July-Sept. 1975, at 296 (1975); David R. Shaffer et al.,
Intervention in the Library: The Effect of Increased Responsibility on Bystanders' Willingness to Prevent
a Theft, 5 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 303 (1975).
5. See Shaffer et al., supra note 4.
6. See Philip E. Tetlock & Jae I. Kim, Accountability and Judgment Processes in a Personality
Prediction Task, 52 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700 (1987).
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Clifford Mynatt & Steven J. Sherman, Responsibility Attribution in Groups and
Individuals: A Direct Test of the Diffusion of Responsibility Hypothesis, 32 J. PEP S. & SOC. PSYCHOL
1111 (1975).
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decision.9 Therefore, if negative consequences are seen as likely to follow
from one's decision, one will reduce cognitive conflict by avoiding or denying
responsibility for the outcome. If personal responsibility is clear, one will
avoid cognitive conflict by making choices that are unlikely to result in
negative consequences. If perceived personal responsibility is low, one should
be more willing to make decisions that could result in negative outcomes.
From the comments of the jurors in the CJP, it seems clear that the negative
decision that weighs most heavily on jurors' minds is the taking of the
defendant's life.'0 It is therefore reasonable to assume that any factor that
increases the responsibility felt by a juror will decrease the likelihood of that
juror making the choice that would potentially have the most negative
consequences-the death penalty.
It should be noted that avoiding responsibility for a negative occurrence is
not a universal finding in the psychology literature. Sometimes individuals are
willing to take more than their fair share of responsibility for negative
outcomes," even when these outcomes involve crimes committed against the
self, such as rape. 2 Nevertheless, understanding the role of responsibility in
juror decision-making is essential to identifying potential problems and biases
in the judgments that are made during the sentencing phase of capital trials.
II. SOURCES FOR RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTION
Given that the degree of personal responsibility felt by jurors is an
important factor in the sentencing phase in capital trials, it is important to
consider the various sources of responsibility that are available to the juror.
Aside from the self, the juror has six other major sources upon which to place
responsibility for the sentencing decision. These have all been discussed to
some extent in the preceding articles, 3 but it will nevertheless be helpful to
formally identify and consider these six sources in order to understand the
level of responsibility experienced by a juror.
9. Joel Cooper & Russell H. Fazio, A New Look at Dissonance Theory, 17 ADvANCEs ExP. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 229, 241-43 (1984).
10. See Hoffmann, supra note 1, at 1155-56 ("Almost all of the jurors mentioned how they initially
felt uncomfortable, sometimes even overwhelmed, by the role that they were being asked to play during
the sentencing portion of the capital trial."); Maria Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change
Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. LJ. 1183, 1208
(1995) ("'I didn't want to give [the defendant] the death sentence .... [T]he average person is not used
to that [decision], and, the average person has a fight within themselves to find out what their views
are.") (quoting an unidentified Kentucky juror).
11. Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. PERS. &
SOC. PSYCHOL 322, 334-35 (1979).
12. Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Characterological Versus Behavioral Self-Blame: Inquiries into
Depression and Rape, 37 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1798, 1806 (1979).
13. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. LJ. 1043, 1094-97 (1995) (providing statistical information on the sources of
responsibility and discussing how capital jurors apportion responsibility for their decisions between the
law, the judge, the appeals process, the jury, and themselves); see also Hoffmann, supra note 1, at 1146-
50 (discussing how Indiana capital jurors relied on the law and the judge's sentencing instructions to




Guided discretion requires that standards and guidelines of judgment be
spelled out to jurors so that arbitrary and capricious decisions, as identified
in Furman v. Georgia,4 can be eliminated. Although the setting of rules and
guidelines may make decisions less arbitrary, it may have an additional (and
perhaps unintended) effect on the degree of responsibility experienced by the
jurors, and thus on the likelihood of a life versus death decision. The clearer
the guided discretion, the more likely it is that jurors can place responsibility
for their sentencing decision on the law and its requirements. Where
guidelines are clear, jurors will perceive less freedom for their sentencing
decisions, and perceived freedom enters into one's feelings of cognitive
conflict about any potential negative outcomes of a decision. Thus, the
diminished sense of responsibility stemming from a lack of perceived freedom
in the context of guided discretion might very well increase the likelihood of
a death decision, while at the same time it reduces the likelihood of an
arbitrary or capricious death decision.
B. The Judge
Perceiving the judge as a major locus of responsibility for the sentencing
decision is more likely to occur in some states than in others. In states such
as Indiana, where jurors are told that their sentencing decisions are only
recommendations to the judge (who is not bound by these recommenda-
tions),' 5 jurors are likely to attribute a substantial amount of responsibility
to the judge, thereby diminishing their own sense of responsibility. Accor-
dingly, one would predict that (all other things being equal), death decisions
should be more likely in states where jurors' sentencing decisions are not
binding, but are only recommendations to judges.
C. The Defendant
The defendant is an especially attractive source for responsibility attribution.
Given the previous guilt decision for murder, it is easy for jurors to see the
defendant as responsible for any consequences that might then occur. To the
extent that the prosecution can point to the evilness of the defendant, jurors
can diminish their own sense of responsibility, and blame the murderer for his
own execution.
14. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
15. See IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (1993); see also Hoffinann, supra note 1, at 1146-48.
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D. The Appeal Process
From the point of view of a juror in a capital case, it is a virtual certainty
that a jury verdict for the death penalty will be appealed. Thus, another judge,
another court, or the state's governor will have the decision-making power to
overturn the jury's decision. This knowledge should clearly reduce the jurors'
perceived responsibility, because the final accountability is not theirs.
Interestingly, states such as Indiana are now calling for a far more restricted
appeal process for death decisions.' 6 Opponents of the death penalty want
very much to keep the appeal process as open as possible in order to protect
the rights (and perhaps the life) of the defendant. Ironically, the greater the
number of appeal possibilities, the weaker will be the jurors' feelings of
responsibility during the sentencing process. The present analysis suggests that
this will lead to greater numbers of death decisions that will then need to be
appealed. Accordingly, with a no-appeal process, death decisions might be
minimized (although such a process has many legal and ethical reasons for
questioning it).
E. The Community
Jurors are informed that they have been chosen as representatives of the
community, and that they must represent the moral values of that community.
In a capital case, there is often outrage and anger in the community-at-large
about the murder. Cries for retribution and a death sentence are common.
Believing that they are simply conduits for the expression of community
values can greatly diminish the jurors' personal sense of responsibility. To the
extent that this occurs, more death sentences are likely.
F. Other Jurors
In his review of the comments of CJP participants, Professor Hoffmann
points out that jurors often share the responsibility of the decision with other
jurors. 7 This is a very important observation, and it relates directly to the
social psychology literature concerning group versus individual decision-
making. When decisions are made in a group setting (as in a jury, and
especially when the decision rule is unanimous) rather than by individuals,
feelings of responsibility are consistently diminished. This diffusion of
responsibility to other group members is one of the predominant explanations
for why groups make riskier and more polarized decisions than do individuals.
In addition to feelings of diminished responsibility in a group setting,
individuals in certain kinds of groups often feel anonymous, and experience
what social psychologists refer to as "deindividuation." These feelings of
16. See 1994 Ind. Acts 158, § 7 (to be codified at IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(h)) (effective July 1,
1995) (mandating that executions be carried out within one year plus one day of conviction).
17. Hoffnann, supra note 1, at 1149-50.
12451995]
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deindividuation have been used to explain why groups (to a greater degree
than individuals) engage in antisocial acts such as rioting or looting.1 8 In a
deindividuated state, people will often engage in more behaviors that are
likely to bring about aversive consequences. At the least, deindividuated
behavior in groups is more likely to be guided by social norms than is
individual behavior. 9
Professor Hoffmann's observations suggest that members of a jury may
experience a diminished sense of responsibility and feel deindividuated during
the jury decision-making process. Feelings of deindividuation might be
especially likely in a jury, where the members are referred to by juror number
rather than by name. To the extent that diminished responsibility and feelings
of deindividuation lead to greater exposure to the possibility of aversive
consequences, jurors may make more death decisions than would individuals
or individuated members of a group.
On the other hand, there is one aspect of jury decision-making that can lead
to feelings of greater responsibility. Jurors can, in some cases, choose to
disregard or nullify the judge's instructions. 20 This possibility, which is more
likely to occur in some states than in others, would require a thoughtful group
decision by the jury members and would no doubt lead to feelings of
heightened responsibility by jurors.
Related to the findings that group members generally feel less responsible
for their decisions than do individuals, and that these feelings can lead to
more decisions where the possibility of negative outcomes is higher, is the
finding that group decisions are generally more extreme than are individual
decisions.2' Whatever the majority of individual members may have felt prior
to group deliberations, these feelings will be exacerbated during the group
decision-making process. This generally leads to groups making more
polarized and more extreme decisions than individuals. There are many
reasons for this occurrence, one of which is the fact that different individuals
may have different reasons for their individual decisions. When each person
is then exposed to other supporting arguments by the other group members
who share their decision outcome, they become even more polarized. Research
clearly demonstrates that jury deliberations produce this polarization effect.22
Group polarization effects can explain why juries almost always make
decisions that are in line with the initial majority. Kalven and Zeisel found
that "the jury in roughly nine out of ten cases decides in the direction of the
initial majority. ' 23 Thus, if individual jurors have (contrary to instructions)
18. See Robert D. Johnson & Leslie L. Downing, Deindividuation and Valence of Cues: Effects on
Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior, 37 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1532, 1537 (1979).
19. ELIOT R. SMITH & DIANE M. MACKIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 408-09 (1955).
20. See Alan W. Seheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972).
21. David G. Myers & Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOL. BULL.
602, 609-11 (1976).
22. See Martin F. Kaplan & Charles E. Miller, Group Decision Making and Normative Versus
Information Influence: Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned Decision Rule, 53 J. PEs. & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 306 (1987).
23. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 488 (1966).
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pre-decided the punishment before any group discussion, whatever majority
opinion is present at that time will very likely prevail. Interestingly, when
there is no clear majority initially, group decisions are far more likely to favor
the defendant, a phenomenon that MaeCoun and Kerr refer to as the "leniency
bias. 24
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES GOOD DECISION-MAKING BY THE JURY?
According to the present analysis, the stronger the personal responsibility
experienced by jurors, the less likely is a death penalty decision. The weaker
the personal responsibility experienced by jurors, the more likely is a death
penalty decision. Some of the factors and issues that lead jurors to feel
differing degrees of personal responsibility have been discussed. Nevertheless,
one final point about the relation between jurors' experienced personal
responsibility and the sentencing decisions at capital trials should be noted.
Under the present judicial system, the correct attribution of responsibility for
the jury's decision is simply not clear. How much responsibility should go to
the judge or to the law or to the community-at-large? How much responsi-
bility should fall on the mind or heart of a juror? One can speak of the factors
that increase or decrease the levels of responsibility attributed to any source,
but there is no way to judge the accuracy of these levels.
Similarly, the "correct" number or proportion of death penalty decisions is
not easily established. Stated another way, although increased responsibility
may lead jurors to make fewer death decisions, and decreased responsibility
may lead them to make more death decisions, it is not at all clear whether
increased or decreased responsibility leads to better decision-making. In order
to judge the correctness or propriety of jury sentencing decisions in capital
crimes, one would need some objective normative standard against which to
judge the proportion of death decisions. There simply is no such standard.
Diminishing the responsibility felt by jurors from the level of responsibility
that is experienced under current procedures and practices might result in too
many death penalty decisions. Increasing the responsibility experienced by
jurors from the level of responsibility experienced under current procedures
and practices might result in too few death penalty decisions.
Without an objective standard of judgment, the "correct" number of death
penalty decisions depends on one's values. At one extreme, the "correct"
number of death penalty decisions for a person who does not believe in
capital punishment is clearly zero, in which case the greater the responsibility
experienced by jurors, the better. At the other extreme, the "correct" number
of death penalty decisions for the one who believes in maximum punishment
and holds an "eye-for-an-eye" value system is very large. In this case, the
less responsibility experienced by jurors, the better.
24. Robert J. MaeCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation:
Jurors' Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 21, 31 (1988).
12471995]
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In addition to one's value system, whether a life or death decision is correct
in the eyes of a juror, the public, or perhaps even the law, depends on which
type of error is more acceptable in a capital sentencing procedure. In a
sentencing decision, there are two types of errors that a juror or judge might
make. A defendant might be wrongly sentenced to death, or a defendant might
be wrongly allowed to live. It is difficult to know how jurors might think
about the issue of which kind of error is more important or which kind of
error should be given the greater weight, but it is almost certain that jurors do
think about this issue. It is therefore instructive to analyze the factors
involved in such thinking.
For the error of wrongly sentencing a defendant to death, there are three
ways in which this decision might be costly to the juror. The first (and worst
possible) case occurs when the defendant is executed, and it is then discov-
ered that he is (or may have been) innocent of the crime. This situation would
clearly be very painful for the jurors, and illustrates the terrible consequence
a death decision would bring if the decision were in error. In a second
scenario, the jurors might believe that the defendant may come to lead a
productive life while in prison or in the community-at-large after parole if he
is not executed. This outcome is not knowable, of course, because once the
defendant is executed, we have no access to a counter-factual world in which
the defendant might have lived. Nevertheless, the issue is no doubt one that
jurors consider. In a third case, the jurors might experience great guilt in the
future, after the defendant is executed, simply because a human life has been
taken. Such reasoning involves thinking about the future, and while people are
notoriously poor at predicting their own future behavior or their own future
feelings,25 such considerations of future feelings are clear in many of the
comments of the jurors who were interviewed in the CJP.26
With regard to the error of wrongly foregoing the death penalty for a long
prison sentence, there is only one real consideration. The murderer may live
to kill again, either within prison, or after release from prison. For a jury that
sentences a murderer to imprisonment rather than death and later learns of
subsequent killings by this murderer, the emotional pain would be great.
It is difficult to know exactly how a juror might think about the possible
errors that could follow from a sentencing decision, but such considerations
(in addition to the level of personally experienced responsibility) are bound
to be an important part of the sentencing decision. If the trial or the
instructions make salient a particular type of error, this will likely tip the
balance in favor of one decision or the other.
25. Steven J. Sherman, On the Self-Erasing Nature of Errors of Prediction, 39 J. PERS. & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 211, 217 (1980); see also Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predicting a Changing Taste:
Do People Know What They Will Like? 5 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAK'NG 187, 197-98 (1992).
26. See Hoffinann, supra note 1, at 1146 ("'Before you [sentence the defendant to death], make sure
that you can sleep tonight or next week or the rest of your life with what you've done.") (quoting an
unidentified Indiana juror describing his argument to his peers against imposing a death sentence).
1248 [Vol. 70:1241
